标题： 竞争者之间的合作在少数派游戏中 显示英文标题

标题： Cooperation amongst competing agents in minority games

摘要： 我们研究了少数者游戏的一种变体。 有N个代理。 每个代理每天必须在两个选项中选择一个，较小群体的每个成员都会得到奖励。 代理之间不能互相通信，但只能根据过去选择两个选项的人数的历史来猜测其他人的选择。 我们描述了一种简单的概率策略，通过该策略，独立行动的代理仍可以最大化每天受益的人数平均值。 该策略导致资源的高效利用，平均偏离最大可能值可以达到$(N^{\epsilon})$的量级，对于任何$\epsilon >0$都可以实现。 我们还证明，单个代理如果不遵循该策略，不会期望获得收益。 显示英文摘要

摘要： We study a variation of the minority game. There are N agents. Each has to choose between one of two alternatives everyday, and there is reward to each member of the smaller group. The agents cannot communicate with each other, but try to guess the choice others will make, based only the past history of number of people choosing the two alternatives. We describe a simple probabilistic strategy using which the agents acting independently, can still maximize the average number of people benefitting every day. The strategy leads to a very efficient utilization of resources, and the average deviation from the maximum possible can be made of order $(N^{\epsilon})$, for any $\epsilon >0$. We also show that a single agent does not expect to gain by not following the strategy.