标题： 战略信念模型中强制迭代可接受性 显示英文标题

标题： Forcing Iterated Admissibility in Strategic Belief Models

摘要： 序贯可接受性（IA）可以被视为博弈中理性的一个最小标准。为了使这一直觉更加精确，近年来人们积极研究了这种博弈论解的概念特征：已经证明，在完全的字典序类型结构中，经过 m+1 轮序贯可接受性筛选后存活的策略，可以被识别为在一种称为“理性与 m 次理性假设”（RmAR）条件下得到的那些策略。另一方面，已经表明，其极限条件$R\infty AR$在类型类完整且类型连续的情况下，可能不会在认识论结构中的任何状态中满足。本文引入了一个较弱的完整性概念，尽管如此，它仍然足以高度一般地将 IA 表征为确实满足$R\infty AR$的策略类。关键的方法创新在于定义了一种新的“典型类型”的概念，并将其与科恩强迫技术结合使用。 显示英文摘要

摘要： Iterated admissibility (IA) can be seen as exhibiting a minimal criterion of rationality in games. In order to make this intuition more precise, the epistemic characterization of this game-theoretic solution has been actively investigated in recent times: it has been shown that strategies surviving m+1 rounds of iterated admissibility may be identified as those that are obtained under a condition called rationality and m assumption of rationality (RmAR) in complete lexicographic type structures. On the other hand, it has been shown that its limit condition, $R\infty AR$, might not be satisfied by any state in the epistemic structure, if the class of types is complete and the types are continuous. In this paper we introduce a weaker notion of completeness which is nonetheless sufficient to characterize IA in a highly general way as the class of strategies that indeed satisfy $R\infty AR$. The key methodological innovation involves defining a new notion of generic types and employing these in conjunction with Cohen's technique of forcing.