标题： 空间社会困境中的手足情与利己主义的共存 显示英文标题

标题： Coexistence of fraternity and egoism for spatial social dilemmas

摘要： 我们研究了一个具有空间排列玩家的演化博弈模型，这些玩家在与邻居互动时可以选择两种策略之一（对于社会困境问题，称为合作和背叛）。除了当前模型中通常策略的应用之外，玩家还通过两种极端个性特征之一来表征，代表自私或兄弟情谊的行为。 在演化过程中，每个玩家可以通过近视更新过程修改自己的策略和/或个性特征，以提高她的效用。 数值模拟和稳定性分析的结果总结在相图中，当改变收益参数时，相图表示了策略和个性特征的空间有序分布的广泛尺度。 在大多数情况下，只有四种可能选项中的两种占据主导地位，并且可能会形成亚晶格有序的空间结构。 兄弟情谊态度的演化优势在广泛的收益参数范围内得到证明，包括囚徒困境区域，在该区域中，自私的背叛者和兄弟情谊的合作者形成了角色分离的棋盘状模式。 显示英文摘要

摘要： We have studied an evolutionary game with spatially arranged players who can choose one of the two strategies (named cooperation and defection for social dilemmas) when playing with their neighbors. In addition to the application of the usual strategies in the present model the players are also characterized by one of the two extreme personal features representing the egoist or fraternal behavior. During the evolution each player can modify both her own strategy and/or personal feature via a myopic update process in order to improve her utility. The results of numerical simulations and stability analysis are summarized in phase diagrams representing a wide scale of spatially ordered distribution of strategies and personal features when varying the payoff parameters. In most of the cases only two of the four possible options prevail and may form sublattice ordered spatial structure. The evolutionary advantage of the fraternal attitude is demonstrated within a large range of payoff parameters including the region of prisoner's dilemma where egoist defectors and fraternal cooperators form a role-separating chessboard-like pattern.