标题： 通过制度激励和自愿参与促进合作的演变 显示英文标题

标题： The evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives and optional participation

摘要： 奖励和惩罚是常见的实用工具，可用于促进社会制度中的合作。 在联合企业中，通过奖励和惩罚激励下的合作演化已被形式化并进行了研究，主要通过强制性公共物品博弈。 最近，Sasaki 等人（2012, Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 109:1165-1169）考虑了可选参与以及制度激励，并描述了这些机制之间的相互作用如何影响公共物品博弈中合作的演化。 在这里，我们对这些演化动态进行了完整的分类。 具体而言，当惩罚足够大以至于在公共物品博弈参与为强制的情况下导致合作与背叛的双稳态时，如果公共物品博弈的参与是可选的，这些惩罚最终将导致合作。 在这种可选情况下，基于强制的合作的全局稳定性与在强制情况下观察到的双稳态形成鲜明对比。 我们还认为，在奖励下，可选参与并不那么有效来提高合作。 显示英文摘要

摘要： Rewards and penalties are common practical tools that can be used to promote cooperation in social institutions. The evolution of cooperation under reward and punishment incentives in joint enterprises has been formalized and investigated, mostly by using compulsory public good games. Recently, Sasaki et al. (2012, Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 109:1165-1169) considered optional participation as well as institutional incentives and described how the interplay between these mechanisms affects the evolution of cooperation in public good games. Here, we present a full classification of these evolutionary dynamics. Specifically, whenever penalties are large enough to cause the bi-stability of both cooperation and defection in cases in which participation in the public good game is compulsory, these penalties will ultimately result in cooperation if participation in the public good game is optional. The global stability of coercion-based cooperation in this optional case contrasts strikingly with the bi-stability that is observed in the compulsory case. We also argue that optional participation is not so effective at improving cooperation under rewards.