标题： 二元交换网络中的分布式讨价还价 显示英文标题

标题： Distributed bargaining in dyadic-exchange networks

摘要： 本文考虑了二元交换网络，其中个体代理自主形成大小为二的联盟，并就如何分配可转移效用达成一致。 此博弈的有效结果包括稳定的结果（如果代理没有单方面偏离的动机）、平衡的结果（如果匹配的代理从合作中获得相似的利益），或纳什结果（既稳定又平衡的结果）。 我们设计了可证明正确的连续时间算法，以分布式方式找到这些结果类别。 我们设计的寻找纳什讨价还价解决方案的算法建立在另外两个算法的基础上，使寻找稳定结果的动力学过程为寻找平衡结果的动力学过程提供输入。 我们建立收敛性和鲁棒性的技术方法结合了优化、图论、非光滑分析和李雅普诺夫稳定性理论的概念和工具，并为进一步扩展提供了有用框架。 我们在无线通信场景中说明了我们的结果，其中单天线设备有可能作为2天线虚拟设备工作以提高信道容量。 显示英文摘要

摘要： This paper considers dyadic-exchange networks in which individual agents autonomously form coalitions of size two and agree on how to split a transferable utility. Valid results for this game include stable (if agents have no unilateral incentive to deviate), balanced (if matched agents obtain similar benefits from collaborating), or Nash (both stable and balanced) outcomes. We design provably-correct continuous-time algorithms to find each of these classes of outcomes in a distributed way. Our algorithmic design to find Nash bargaining solutions builds on the other two algorithms by having the dynamics for finding stable outcomes feeding into the one for finding balanced ones. Our technical approach to establish convergence and robustness combines notions and tools from optimization, graph theory, nonsmooth analysis, and Lyapunov stability theory and provides a useful framework for further extensions. We illustrate our results in a wireless communication scenario where single-antenna devices have the possibility of working as 2-antenna virtual devices to improve channel capacity.