标题： 先进人工智能的产业政策：计算定价与安全税 显示英文标题

标题： Industrial Policy for Advanced AI: Compute Pricing and the Safety Tax

摘要： 在一个代理竞争开发潜在危险新技术（AI）的模型中，我们研究了生产要素（计算资源）的价格变化如何影响代理人的策略，特别是他们用于减少新技术危险的安全支出。在该模型中，代理人将支出分为安全和性能两部分，安全决定了“灾难”结果的概率，而性能决定了代理人相对于同行的竞争力。对于给定的参数化，我们通过数值计算纳什均衡来确定理论上的最优支出策略。使用这种方法，我们发现：（1）在对称情况下，只有当性能的生产比安全的生产增长更快时，计算价格的上涨才会促进安全；（2）通过向单一代理人提供足够大的补贴，可以将灾难发生的概率降低到任意低的程度；（3）当代理人生产率不同时，向更高效的代理人提供补贴通常比向其他代理人提供相同补贴更有利于整体安全（有一些条件，我们进行了讨论）；（4）当一个代理人更为注重安全时（即相对于其竞争对手认为安全更难实现），对该代理人进行补贴通常比对其竞争对手进行补贴更有利于整体安全；然而，对仅稍微更注重安全的代理人进行补贴往往会降低安全性。因此，尽管根据直觉，补贴一个更加注重安全或更具生产力的代理人通常会提高安全性，但补贴一个稍微更注重安全或更具生产力的代理人有时可能有害。 显示英文摘要

摘要： Using a model in which agents compete to develop a potentially dangerous new technology (AI), we study how changes in the pricing of factors of production (computational resources) affect agents' strategies, particularly their spending on safety meant to reduce the danger from the new technology. In the model, agents split spending between safety and performance, with safety determining the probability of a ``disaster" outcome, and performance determining the agents' competitiveness relative to their peers. For given parameterizations, we determine the theoretically optimal spending strategies by numerically computing Nash equilibria. Using this approach we find that (1) in symmetric scenarios, compute price increases are safety-promoting if and only if the production of performance scales faster than the production of safety; (2) the probability of a disaster can be made arbitrarily low by providing a sufficiently large subsidy to a single agent; (3) when agents differ in productivity, providing a subsidy to the more productive agent is often better for aggregate safety than providing the same subsidy to other agent(s) (with some qualifications, which we discuss); (4) when one agent is much more safety-conscious, in the sense of believing that safety is more difficult to achieve, relative to his competitors, subsidizing that agent is typically better for aggregate safety than subsidizing its competitors; however, subsidizing an agent that is only somewhat more safety-conscious often decreases safety. Thus, although subsidizing a much more safety-conscious, or productive, agent often improves safety as intuition suggests, subsidizing a somewhat more safety-conscious or productive agent can often be harmful.