标题： 无法通过中介实现非理性的相关均衡 显示英文标题

标题： Achieving Irrational Correlated Equilibria without Mediator

摘要： 本文研究了完全信息博弈中去中心化信息传输机制的实现和性能。 我们提出了一种无需中介的机制，通过一系列有限的廉价谈话实现无需中介的非理性相关均衡。 该机制设计用于至少五名玩家的环境，利用加密技术保护私人信息和战略选择。 核心过程涉及三名玩家对均衡进行分解和加密，而另外两名玩家安全地随机化并将加密的建议传递给指定玩家。 我们的结果表明，所有非理性相关均衡都可以通过此机制实现，该机制在战略上具有鲁棒性且可实际实施。 显示英文摘要

摘要： This paper investigates the implementation and performance of a decentralized information transmission mechanism in complete information games. We propose a mediator-free mechanism that realizes mediator-free irrational correlated equilibria through a finite sequence of cheap talk. Designed for environments with at least five players, the mechanism leverages encryption techniques to safeguard private information and strategic choices. The core procedure involves three players decomposing and encrypting the equilibrium, while two other players securely randomize and deliver the encrypted recommendations to designated players. Our results demonstrate that all irrational correlated equilibria can be achieved through this mechanism, which is both strategically robust and practically implementable.