标题： 柠檬市场的说服力 显示英文标题

标题： Persuasion in Lemons Markets

摘要： 我们研究竞争性市场中的信息披露问题。卖方私下观察产品质量，高质量意味着更高的生产成本，而买方在观察到一个公共信号后以市场清算价格进行交易。由于卖方参与交易会传递关于质量的信息，设计者面临她能够诱导的后验概率集合中的内生约束。我们将设计者的问题重新表述为一个鞅最优传输问题，并增加一个额外条件以排除通过卖方参与决策进一步传递信息的可能性，同时刻画了最优信号。当设计者最大化交易量时，解决方案表现出低效和高效卖方的负向匹配。当目标是价格和剩余的加权组合时，只要价格的权重足够高，最优信号就会保持这种结构，否则它们会完全揭示低质量类型，同时将中间类型与高质量卖方合并。 显示英文摘要

摘要： We study information disclosure in competitive markets with adverse selection. Sellers privately observe product quality, with higher quality entailing higher production costs, while buyers trade at the market-clearing price after observing a public signal. Because sellers' participation in trade conveys information about quality, the designer faces endogenous constraints in the set of posteriors that she can induce. We reformulate the designer's problem as a martingale optimal transport exercise with an additional condition that rules out further information transmission through sellers' participation decisions, and characterize the optimal signals. When the designer maximizes trade volume, the solution features negative-assortative matching of inefficient and efficient sellers. When the objective is a weighted combination of price and surplus, optimal signals preserve this structure as long as the weight on the price is high enough, otherwise they fully reveal low-quality types while pooling middle types with high-quality sellers.