标题： 博弈论下的竞争双病毒SIS流行病中的社会疏离 显示英文标题

标题： Game-theoretic Social Distancing in Competitive Bi-Virus SIS Epidemics

摘要： 许多因素驱动传染病在复杂现实网络中的传播。 特别值得关注的是与疾病传播同步演化的社会行为。 此外，最近的研究强调了理解多种毒株如何同时在人群中传播的重要性（例如，SARS-CoV-2的Delta和Omicron变种）。 在本文中，我们提出了一种与博弈论社会疏离行为模型耦合的双病毒SIS流行病模型。 这些行为由进化博弈论中的复制者方程所支配。 每种毒株的流行程度影响个体选择社会疏离的决策，而他们的行为反过来又会影响SIS模型中每种病毒的传播。 我们的分析确定了系统的平衡点及其局部稳定性特性，这些特性揭示了几种具有不同社会疏离水平的孤立固定点。 我们发现，只有当两种毒株的繁殖数相等时，地方性共存才是可能的。 假设每种病毒的繁殖数相同，我们确定了产生共存平衡线的适当参数范围。 此外，我们还确定了这些平衡线的局部指数稳定性的条件。 我们通过几个数值模拟来说明我们的发现。 显示英文摘要

摘要： Numerous elements drive the spread of infectious diseases in complex real-world networks. Of particular interest is social behaviors that evolve in tandem with the spread of disease. Moreover, recent studies highlight the importance of understanding how multiple strains spread simultaneously through a population (e.g. Delta and Omicron variants of SARS-CoV-2). In this paper, we propose a bi-virus SIS epidemic model coupled with a game-theoretic social distancing behavior model. The behaviors are governed by replicator equations from evolutionary game theory. The prevalence of each strain impacts the choice of an individual to social distance, and, in turn, their behavior affects the spread of each virus in the SIS model. Our analysis identifies equilibria of the system and their local stability properties, which reveal several isolated fixed points with varying levels of social distancing. We find that endemic co-existence is possible only when the reproduction numbers of both strains are equal. Assuming the reproduction number for each virus is the same, we identify suitable parameter regimes that give rise to lines of coexistence equilibria. Moreover, we also identify conditions for local exponential stability of said lines of equilibria. We illustrate our findings with several numerical simulations.