标题： 风险意识的下行均衡用于战略决策制定 显示英文标题

标题： Downside Risk-Aware Equilibria for Strategic Decision-Making

摘要： 博弈论传统上对风险的看法相对有限，基于其他玩家行动的不确定性如何影响玩家的预期回报。 最近，一种新的博弈论方法提供了更全面的风险视角，同时考虑了回报的方差。 然而，这些基于方差的方法同时衡量了回报的上行和下行方差。 在许多领域，如金融，只有下行风险才是关键，因为这代表了与决策相关的潜在损失。 相反，大的上行“风险”（例如利润）并不是问题。 为了解决这种对风险的限制性看法，我们提出了一种新的解概念，即基于下偏矩的下行风险感知均衡（DRAE）。 DRAE限制下行风险，而对上行风险没有任何限制，并且还建模了高阶风险偏好。 我们在几个游戏中展示了DRAE的适用性，成功找到了平衡下行风险与预期回报的均衡，并证明了这种均衡的存在性和最优性。 显示英文摘要

摘要： Game theory has traditionally had a relatively limited view of risk based on how a player's expected reward is impacted by the uncertainty of the actions of other players. Recently, a new game-theoretic approach provides a more holistic view of risk also considering the reward-variance. However, these variance-based approaches measure variance of the reward on both the upside and downside. In many domains, such as finance, downside risk only is of key importance, as this represents the potential losses associated with a decision. In contrast, large upside "risk" (e.g. profits) are not an issue. To address this restrictive view of risk, we propose a novel solution concept, downside risk aware equilibria (DRAE) based on lower partial moments. DRAE restricts downside risk, while placing no restrictions on upside risk, and additionally, models higher-order risk preferences. We demonstrate the applicability of DRAE on several games, successfully finding equilibria which balance downside risk with expected reward, and prove the existence and optimality of this equilibria.