标题： 工作不安全感与理性预期新凯恩斯模型中的均衡确定性。理论分析 显示英文标题

标题： Job insecurity and equilibrium determinacy in a rational expectations, New Keynesian model with asymmetric information. A theoretical analysis

摘要： 尽管这个变量在宏观经济背景中非常重要，但目前关于工作不安全感的研究主要局限于其非系统性维度。 本文的研究目的是在公共和私人代理之间存在信息不对称、信息冲击以及制度沟通透明度不同水平的情况下，识别工作不安全感的短期和长期宏观经济决定因素。 为了实现这一目标，提出了一种小规模的理性预期新凯恩斯模型，在该模型中，有限知情的家庭和企业会从完全知情的政府和中央银行那里接收到一个可能带有噪声的信息信号，用于了解不可观测因素。 研究发现，尽管满足泰勒原则，但如果公共代理人在没有沟通模糊的情况下将所有可用信息传递给私人代理人，该模型会存在一个唯一且稳定的均衡路径，在此路径上“透明度悖论”可能会出现。 否则，从均衡存在性和多重性角度来看，模型的动力学变得不可预测，而工作不安全感在均衡确定性中可能发挥根本性作用。 讨论了适当的政策建议。 显示英文摘要

摘要： Despite the importance of this variable in the macroeconomic context, current research on job insecurity remains mainly confined to its non-systemic dimension. The research aim of this paper is to identify the short-run and long-run macroeconomic determinants of job insecurity in the presence of asymmetric information between public and private agents, informative shocks, and different degrees of institutional communication transparency. To accomplish this goal, a small-scale, rational expectations, New Keynesian model is proposed in which limitedly informed households and firms receive a potentially noisy informative signal about the unobservables from fully informed government and central bank. It is found that, notwithstanding the fulfillment of the Taylor principle, if public agents transfer all the available information to the private agents without communication ambiguities, the model admits a unique, stable equilibrium path along which the 'Paradox of Transparency' can emerge. Otherwise, the model's dynamics become unpredictable in terms of equilibrium existence and multiplicity, and job insecurity plays a potentially fundamental role in equilibrium determinacy. Appropriate policy recommendations are discussed.