标题： 学术不端行为中的战略互动：考试试卷交换机制的博弈论分析 显示英文标题

标题： Strategic Interactions in Academic Dishonesty: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Exam Script Swapping Mechanism

摘要： 本文提出了一种新颖的博弈论框架，通过一种独特的威慑机制——被抓到抄袭的学生之间的强制考试试卷交换，来分析学术不诚实行为。 我们将学生之间的战略互动建模为一个具有不对称信息的非合作博弈，并研究了三种基础情景：不对称准备水平、相互不准备和协调的部分准备。 我们的分析表明，通过在结果中引入战略相互依赖性，试卷交换惩罚比传统惩罚产生了更强的威慑效果。 纳什均衡分析表明，相互准备成为占优策略。 该框架为制度政策设计提供了见解，表明能够创造相互脆弱性的非常规惩罚机制可能比传统的个体惩罚更有效。 提出了未来的经验验证和行为实验来测试模型预测，包括对惩罚严重性随时间减弱效应的探索。 显示英文摘要

摘要： This paper presents a novel game theoretic framework for analyzing academic dishonesty through the lens of a unique deterrent mechanism: forced exam script swapping between students caught copying. We model the strategic interactions between students as a non cooperative game with asymmetric information and examine three base scenarios asymmetric preparation levels, mutual non preparation, and coordinated partial preparation. Our analysis reveals that the script swapping punishment creates a stronger deterrent effect than traditional penalties by introducing strategic interdependence in outcomes. The Nash equilibrium analysis demonstrates that mutual preparation emerges as the dominant strategy. The framework provides insights for institutional policy design, suggesting that unconventional punishment mechanisms that create mutual vulnerability can be more effective than traditional individual penalties. Future empirical validation and behavioral experiments are proposed to test the model predictions, including explorations of tapering off effects in punishment severity over time.